At the end of last month, Apple released a letter to its customers protesting about a US court order that could force the company to give the FBI a back door entry to individual iPhones. The case has brought the debate about government access to personal data and the protection of civil liberties to the fore once again. It has also made society and industry look more closely at the mechanics of data encryption and ask what makes the technology effective.
At its most basic, encryption provides a layer of protection for data at every stage of its journey from sender to recipient. If anyone tries to intercept or access the data without permission, they find themselves with a screen full of unintelligible gobbledygook. But encryption is only strong if there are no weak links in the chain. Apple argues that the FBI’s court order requesting a back door into its OS (Operating System) would force the company to create such a weak link in its encryption. This would undoubtedly speed up investigations of high profile crimes, but would come at high cost to the millions of law abiding iPhone users.
The newly created back door would very quickly become a target for hackers and cyber criminals; we know from experience that there are plenty of cyber-geeks out there who would be keen to find a key of their own just for the hell of it. But there is also a whole wealth of very unsavory people with very dark motives waiting to kick in any back door that Apple creates.
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